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Abstract: In a sample of 111 MBO offers between 1984 and 1987, almost 
30% attract new blockholders. These blockholders are primarily professional 
investors who act to facilitate a takeover by a higher bidder, thus increasing 
returns to both themselves and other public shareholders. In contrast, I find 
little evidence that pre-existing blockholders, particularly institutional holders, 
affect either the offer outcome or actively participate in the buyout contest 
once it begins. The overall pattern of results suggests that professional 
investors, particularly equity-holding companies, are 'control specialists' who 
provide valuable services as brokers in the market for corporate control.  
 
1. Introduction  
Academic researchers have long recognized the incentives to 
acquire blocks during control contests. Jensen and Ruback (1983) are 
the first to point out that ‘(t)akeover specialists, sometimes referred to 
as ‘raiders’ -who acquire specialized expertise in takeover strategy and 
in ferreting out and amassing a controlling block of shares–perform an 
important function in facilitating transfers of control’. My research 
focuses on management buyout offers (MBO). I investigate the extent 
of block acquisitions by professional investors during these control 
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contests and the role these blockholders play vis-a-vis pre-existing 
blockholders in the contest resolution.  
Two characteristics of MBO offers make them suitable events for 
an initial investigation into the role of professional investors in control 
contests. First, in an MBO there is an inherent conflict of interest 
between management and shareholders over the price offered for the 
firm. Managers have a fiduciary duty to maximize share value. Yet, 
they also have an incentive to sell the firm to themselves as cheaply 
as possible. Researchers (see DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984; 
Lowenstein, 1985; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987; Kaplan, 1989) have 
discussed possible safeguards against managerial self-dealing. The 
acquisition of a block is one such safeguard. Professional investors who 
can detect managerial self-dealing might be able to extract a higher 
premium for both themselves and/or other shareholders.  
Second, there is uncertainty that management will succeed in its 
bid to acquire the firm. While most research focuses on successful 
MBOs (see DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984; Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 
1990), MBO offers are not usually ‘done deals’ when they are 
announced. Kaplan (1989) documents that many MBO attempts are 
contested, and many fail. When an MBO fails, the firm is often taken 
over by a higher bidder. Uncertainty about the success of MBO 
attempts provides opportunities for professional investors to improve 
offer prices.  
The results of this study show that professional investors act to 
improve the terms of buyout offers to shareholders. Many MBO 
attempts attract professional investors, particularly those in equity-
holding companies, who take actions to facilitate the takeover of the 
firm by either themselves or a third party at a higher price. 
Furthermore, these new blockholders seem to fill a niche in the 
monitoring function of outside blockholders. Pre-existing blockholders, 
particularly institutional holders, do not seem to affect the outcome of 
the offer, and do not actively participate in negotiations once the 
contest begins.  
This study makes three contributions. First, the importance of 
new blockholders is demonstrated. Prior research suggests that the ex 
ante level of stock ownership concentration and its division between 
management and outsiders is important in determining the likelihood 
of a takeover (see Manne, 1965; Bradley, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 
1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 
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1988). In this research, the ex post changes in ownership 
concentration are important to the ultimate contest outcome.  
Second, this study expands the notion of the set of players in 
the market for corporate control. Prior research has demonstrated 
empirically the importance of the role of managers, existing 
blockholders (see Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen and Warner, 
1988; and the references therein), competitive bidders (see Bradley, 
Desai, and Kim, 1988), and boards of directors (see Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992). The evidence presented here shows that professional 
investors are also active, influential players in control contests.  
Third, this study builds on similar findings by prior researchers. 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) investigate a sample of block 
acquisitions of 5% or more of a company’s stock, and find that about 
half are associated with a takeover proposal. While block acquisitions 
are usually made by companies that eventually take over the firm, 
some block acquisitions are made by professional investors (defined as 
frequent purchasers) who rarely take over the firm. Mikkelson and 
Ruback (1985) do not investigate whether these investors acquire 
shares in anticipation of a takeover or to actively participate in the 
contest; this study does. Holderness and Sheehan (1986) find that 
after there. has been a block acquisition by a professional investor, 
some firms are eventually taken over by a third party, but do not 
document the actions these investors take to facilitate the takeover. 
Holderness and Sheehan's study is also limited to six controversial 
investors/’raiders’. This study adds to our knowledge of the role of 
takeover specialists by reporting the details of the types of 
professional investors (both frequent acquirers or ‘raiders’ and equity-
holding companies) and the actions they take during MBO events.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the sample, 
measurement, and definition of outside blockholdings, and 
characteristics of MBO contests. Section 3 documents the extent of 
changes in outside blockholdings around an MBO offer, and presents 
evidence on the role professional investors play in the buyout contest. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The sample  
This section describes the sample design and data collection. I 
provide a detailed description on the various definitions of outside 
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blockholders that I use in this study. I also provide descriptive 
statistics of MBO contests.  
 
2.1. Sample design and data  
I obtain a preliminary sample of 90 management buyout 
attempts from 1984 to 1987 from the Dow Jones News/Retrieval 
Service by searching for articles containing the following words or 
phrases: ‘management buyout’, ‘leveraged buyout’, ‘LBO’, ‘MBO’, 
‘going private’, and ‘taken private’. An MBO attempt is defined as any 
announcement in which top management, either alone or with a group 
of equity investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. Forty-eight 
additional management buyout attempts are identified using a sample 
provided by Steven Kaplan.1 Seventeen firms are eliminated because 
of insufficient return data on either the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) or CRSP/NASDAQ tapes to estimate market model 
returns. Eight firms are eliminated because they are not reported by 
Standard & Poor’s. Therefore, data on institutional shareholdings are 
unavailable. Five firms are eliminated because The Insider's Chronicle 
did not report data on inside holdings (The Insider's Chronicle began 
publishing after the relevant dates). The final sample consists of 111 
firms and includes buyouts initiated by both management and outside 
parties.  
The primary sources of data for events during the MBO contest 
are the Wall Street Journal and the Dow Jones News Wire. For each 
firm in the sample I read all articles and news releases for the year 
prior to the initial buyout announcement to two years after or when 
the firm becomes private and ceased to have its activities reported in 
the financial press. I collect event dates and other relevant data for 
each event for the following general categories: initial buyout 
announcement, management actions, actions by independent 
directors, actions by minority shareholders, actions by outside bidders, 
and the buyout outcome. I also collect data on the level of inside 
holdings and total equity value. I obtain data on the level of inside 
ownership concentration the year prior to the MBO offer from the 
firm's proxy statement in the year prior to the MBO offer. Since proxy 
statements do not always occur one year prior to the offer, I adjust 
these data using The Insider's Chronicle. I obtain data on total equity 
value the month prior to the initial buyout offer using share price and 
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shares outstanding data from either the CRSP or CRSP/NASDAQ tapes, 
or Standard & Poor’s Monthly Security Owner’s Stock Guide.  
 
2.2. Data on outside blockholders  
Data on outside block holders are available because of SEC 
disclosure requirements. The SEC requires that institutional investors 
who own, in aggregate, $100 million or more of equity securities must 
file a 13F form. Institutional investors who own 5% or more of the 
shares outstanding of an individual firm (and when the investment is 
made in the ordinary course of business and without the intention of 
changing or influencing control of the firm) must file a 13G form. Both 
forms must be filed quarterly. Institutional investors typically own 1 % 
of a firm’s shares outstanding (see Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988); 
in my sample the average holding is 1.48%. (Because of potential 
reporting lags for institutional holdings, all tests are rerun using the 
highest level of institutional holdings obtained in either the year prior 
to the MBO offer or the two years after the MBO offer. The results are 
qualitatively the same for all tests.) An individual investor or company 
who owns 5% of the shares outstanding must file a schedule 13D 
within ten days of reaching the 5% threshold. The investor must also 
state whether the purpose of the acquisition is to change or influence 
control of the firm. Any changes in the initial 13D, 13F, or 13G form 
must be reported in amended filings. The SEC also requires outside 
investors who own a block or 5% or more (whether a 13G or 13D filer) 
to disclose their holdings in the firm’s annual proxy statement.  
Both 13D and institutional blockholders are included in this 
investigation. Pre-existing blockholders are those who own blocks at 
the time of the announcement of the MBO offer. Since professional 
investors are likely to acquire a block either to anticipate an offer or to 
precipitate an offer, I distinguish between pre-existing blockholders 
who have held a block for at least a year and those that have only 
recently acquired a block. Old blockholders are defined as investors 
who own a block 12 months prior to the MBO offer. New pre-offer 
blockholders are defined as investors who make their initial block 
investment during the year before the MBO offer. New post-offer 
blockholders are those investors who make their initial investment 
after the MBO offer. All of my hypotheses concern the role of new 
post-offer blockholders in the contest. 
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Data on the level of old institutional holdings are obtained from 
Standard & Poor’s Monthly Security Owner’s Stock Guide. I obtain data 
on the level of old 13D outside blockholdings from the firm's proxy 
statement in the year prior to the initial buyout announcement. 
Because not all proxy statements occur exactly one year prior to the 
MBO offer, all data are adjusted using the Dow Jones News Wire or the 
Wall Street Journal. I assume that all 5% investors listed in the firm’s 
proxy statement that are not institutional investors are 13D filers. [I 
identify institutional investors using the classifications in Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith (1988).] This method potentially understates the 
level of old 13D blockholdings. I rerun tests, assuming all 5% 
blockholders reported in the proxy statement are 13D filers. The 
results are qualitatively the same for all tests. Data on new 
blockholders are taken from reports in the Dow Jones News Wire or 
the Wall Street Journal of block acquisitions.  
Using reports of 13D filings rather than the actual filings 
themselves can create potential data problems. First, to the extent 
that not all SEC filings are reported in the Wall Street Journal or the 
Dow Jones News Wire, new block acquisitions are under-reported in 
the sample. Second, reporting lags can lead to some new pre-offer 
blockholders being misclassified as new post-offer blockholders. To 
correct for this problem, I assume a one- month lag for all block 
acquisitions or changes in blockholdings reported in the financial press. 
In addition, I show in Table 3 the adjusted number of days between 
the MBO announcement and the first report of the 13D filing for new 
post-offer blockholders. On average, new post-offer block acquisitions 
occur between four to five months after the MBO announcement, 
indicating that any remaining reporting lags are unlikely to lead to 
misclassifications.  
I also analyze changes in blockholdings over the event period. 
Data on monthly changes in 13D filings are taken from reports of 
amended 13D filings in the Wall Street Journal or an announcement 
over the Dow Jones New Wire. Data on changes in individual 
institutional investor holdings are not available. However, data on 
monthly changes in total institutional holdings are available from 
Standard & Poor’s Monthly Security Owner’s Stock Guide.  
I also search the financial press for changes in institutional 
holdings. Using the classifications in Brickley, Lease, and Smith 
(1988), I find a few instances of 13D filings by institutional investors 
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and report these in Table 4. I find only one report of a block 
acquisition by a 13G filer, who was later sued by the firm for not filing 
a 13D.  
The type of blockholder is also reported, i.e., whether the 
blockholder is a professional investor, institution, miscellaneous 
corporation, or individual. Data on old blockholder types for 5% 
blockholders (whether 13G or 13D) are obtained from the firm’s proxy 
statement. Data on new blockholder types are taken from reports in 
the financial press. Data on the types of actions blockholders take 
(other than an acquisition of shares) are obtained from reports in the 
financial press.  
 
2.3. Sample characteristics of MBO contests  
Table 1 shows the possible outcomes of MBO offers. One of its 
most interesting findings is the low success rate of management 
buyout attempts. Management successfully acquires the firm only 66% 
of the time. If the management buyout fails, the firm is taken over by 
an outside party 63% of the time. Intervening events between the 
management buyout offer and the final acquisition of the firm are 
likely to affect the probability that management successfully acquires 
the firm. In my sample, buyout transactions take an average of seven 
months to complete. The lengthy time needed to complete the buyout 
reinforces the notion that management buyout offers are often 
contested, and that the transition of the firm from public to private 
status is a protracted process.  
To understand the contest, it is important to have in mind the 
process and its stylized facts. (Table 2 reports the frequency and 
chronology of events during the buyout contest, and the stock price 
reaction to these events.) An MBO contest begins with the 
announcement that management, either alone or with a group of 
equity investors, has made an offer to buy the firm. Simultaneously, a 
committee of independent directors is usually formed to evaluate the 
offer and to consider competing bids, often with the help of an 
independent investment banker and/or lawyers retained by the 
committee. The formation of a committee of independent directors is 
reported 64% of the time.  
After the initial offer is made, the bid can be contested by an 
outside third party. Twenty-three percent of the time an outside third 
party (other than a blockholder) makes a higher offer to acquire the 
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firm. Most of these bids occur within three months of the MBO offer 
and are associated with a positive stock price reaction of 7.89%.  
Shareholders can also contest the offer. Minority shareholders 
litigate the fairness of the MBO offer or the fairness of antitakeover 
defenses 40% of the time. The stock price reaction associated with 
minority shareholder litigation is negative but insignificant, which 
suggests such litigation is ineffective in increasing the offer price. In 
contrast, actions, other than the acquisition of the block itself, taken 
by either old or new blockholders, which occurs about 30% of the 
time, are associated with a positive stock price reaction of 13.05%. 
When I exclude announcements that include reports of block 
acquisitions, the remaining announcements (that a blockholder has 
taken some type of action after the MBO offer) are associated with a 
statistically significant three-day abnormal return of 15.11 %. A 
blockholder as a large shareholder is likely to have more leverage over 
the offer. In addition to litigating the fairness of either the offer or the 
antitakeover defenses, a blockholder could achieve membership on the 
board and meet with executives, thereby gaining access to nonpublic 
company information. Such inside information can allow him to devise 
a better restructuring plan under which either management offers a 
higher premium or the firm is sold to a higher bidder. Blockholders can 
also exert pressure on management’s bid by making a higher offer for 
the firm themselves. Furthermore, opportunities to achieve a higher 
premium through any of these actions is likely to attract new 
blockholders. Table 2 shows that announcements of a post-offer block 
acquisition occur about 30% of the time and are associated with a 
positive stock price reaction of 5.49%.  
The board of directors can also contest management’s offer. The 
evidence shows that the board does so infrequently; only 8% of the 
time is there an announcement that the board has rejected 
management’s offer. However, it is likely that management does not 
make a buyout offer without first getting the board’s approval. The few 
announcements of the board rejecting management’s offer are 
associated with a significantly positive stock price reaction. This is 
consistent with previous research, which finds that independent 
directors provide an important monitoring function during control 
contests (see Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 
1994).  
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The management group can respond in several ways to a 
contested offer. Management either revises its offer and/or takes some 
type of antitakeover action, such as litigation of the outside bidder. For 
all the MBOs in the sample, management revises its offer about half 
the time; announcements of these revisions are accompanied with a 
positive stock price reaction of 7.87%. Management also takes actions 
to resist a takeover 16% of the time. Managerial resistance is defined 
as taking anyone of the following actions: adopting an antitakeover 
amendment; litigating an outside bidder; and increasing 
management’s effective stake by buying back shares, debt for equity 
swap, repurchase of convertible preferred or convertible debt for cash, 
private placement of equity, or repurchase of shares from an investor. 
Dann and DeAngelo (1988) show that buyback capital transactions can 
be defensive in nature. However, it is also likely that some of these 
transactions are related to the financing of the buyout and are 
misclassified as resistive. Table 2 shows that many managers take 
countering actions before the MBO offer which suggests that 
management anticipates its offer will be contested.  
Thus, the typical scenario of the MBO contest described above 
provides a context in which to evaluate the influence of professional 
investors on the outcome. The preliminary evidence indicates that 
other players – besides professional investors, i.e., outside third 
parties, management, minority shareholders and independent directors 
– can be involved in setting the buyout premium and determining who 
ultimately acquires the firm.  
 
3. Evidence on the role of professional investors 
during MBO contests  
This section further explores the role of professional investors, 
while controlling for the participation of other players in the contest.  
 
3.1. Increases in outside blockholdings around MBO 
offers  
Changes in the level of both institutional and 13D blockholdings 
(as a percentage of shares outstanding) are shown in Fig. 1. Both 
initial and amended 13D filings are included in the measure of 13D 
holdings. A total of 263 13D filings are reported in the sample; 204 of 
these are purchase transactions and 59 are sales transactions. The 
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majority of these transactions are open market. Only 21 filings are 
reported as negotiated trades. I calculate total 13D blockholdings as 
the sum of each 13D blockholder’s highest holdings within that month. 
With month zero denoting when the offer is announced, both types of 
blockholdings are shown from month – 12 to month + 24, or until the 
buyout is completed. I adjust the percentage of shares owned by 
outside blockholders for any changes in total shares outstanding. 
Reports of 13D filings are adjusted for a one-month lag, and reports of 
institutional holdings are adjusted for a three-month lag.  
Fig. 1 shows that total outside block holdings increase around 
MBO offers, peaking three months before the offer. The decline in 
outside ownership concentration afterwards roughly corresponds to the 
completion rate of the buyouts. Blockholdings of 13D filers increase by 
about 18%, from 14.54% at month – 12 to the highest average value 
of 17.11% in month 2. The increase in 13D holdings after the MBO 
announcement in Fig. 1 appears erratic because both the rate of 
buyout completions and the rate of block acquisitions vary across 
firms. Blockholdings for institutions increase by 16%, from 31.53% at 
month –12 to the highest average value of 37.44% at month –3.  
Table 3 reports the average size of a block acquisition by both 
new and old blockholders. The table shows that MBO offers attract new 
blockholders, who account for the majority of the block acquisitions 
both before and after the MBO announcement. Fifty-five new investors 
acquire a block before the offer, while only four old blockholders 
increase the size of their block. Thirty-five new block acquisitions are 
made after the offer, while new pre-offer blockholders increase the 
size of their holdings only eight times and old blockholders do so only 
four times. 
Table 3 shows that there are incentives for new investors to 
acquire a block both before and after the MBO offer. There are three 
reasons why it is difficult to test the incentives for a block acquisition 
before the offer. First, a random sample of firms is needed to test 
whether a block acquisition increases the probability of an MBO offer; I 
have a nonrandom sample of MBO offers. Second, it is difficult to test 
whether pre-offer blockholders increase the initial offer price. For this 
test, I need the price that management would have offered without 
pressure from the blockholder; this price is unobservable. Third, many 
cases in which pre-offer blockholders facilitate a takeover are not likely 
to be included in my sample. Management is unlikely to make an MBO 
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offer if there is a high probability that such an offer will fail. However, I 
am able to provide evidence on the types of blockholders who acquire 
blocks before the MBO announcement and the type of actions they 
take. The evidence suggests that blockholders who acquire a block 
before the MBO offer play an important role in precipitating the offer.  
 
3.2. Control versus arbitrage  
MBO offers can create profit opportunities for two types of 
professional investors: arbitragers (or inside traders) or control 
specialists. While both types can influence the premium by implicitly 
refusing to tender/vote their shares at the original offer price, control 
specialists distinguish themselves by taking additional actions (such as 
litigating the fairness of the offer) that further escalate the premium. 
Thus, the distinction between arbitrage and control motives for 
professional investors is important, because each has a different 
implication for shareholder wealth. Furthermore, when investors trade 
exclusively for arbitrage or inside information reasons it is empirically 
difficult to infer the direction of causality between block acquisitions by 
professional investors and higher offers. Observing block acquisitions 
prior to higher offers is consistent with both the hypotheses that 
blockholder pressure causes higher offers and that information about 
higher offers (whether obtained illegally or through arbitrage 
expertise) causes block acquisitions. When blockholders take actions, 
it is easier to infer causality; rational blockholders will not take costly 
actions unless they expect to be compensated by an increase in the 
offer premium as a result of these actions.  
The two motivations for block ownership are not mutually 
exclusive, but professional investors who take actions during the 
buyout contest cannot be strictly classified as arbitragers. I classify 
investors who take no action during the buyout contest as passive 
blockholders and blockholders who take actions during the buyout 
contest as active blockholders. Some passive blockholders, however, 
could be misclassified, since blockholders can take unreported actions 
to influence the outcome of the contest. 
Table 4 reports the different types of blockholders who own 
shares either before or after the MBO offer. This table contains two 
findings that show most of the time, block acquisitions are made by 
control specialists in response to the MBO offer. First, the majority of 
investors acquiring shares are best characterized as control 
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specialists/arbitragers (24 out of 35): They are professional investors 
who repeatedly acquire blocks in firms involved in control contests. 
Table 4 shows that these blockholders are primarily frequent acquirers 
and equity-holding companies.2 Furthermore, both frequent acquirers 
and equity-holding companies have been characterized as control 
specialists and/or arbitragers elsewhere; thus the characterization of 
blockholders as control specialists and/or arbitragers is not unique to 
this study (see Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; Mikkelson and Ruback, 
1985; Miller, 1986). Second, about half of these new post-offer block 
acquisitions are made by investors who take actions during the contest 
(17 active versus 18 passive). In addition, Table 4 shows that new 
pre-offer blockholders are most likely to be control 
specialists/arbitragers who are active during the contest.  
Table 4 compares the types of new post-offer investors to pre-
existing blockholders. In contrast to new blockholders, old 
blockholders are more likely to be institutions.3 Such investors make 
up 89 out of 143 old blockholders. Table 4 also shows that institutional 
investors are less likely to increase their holdings during the contest. 
Only nine old blockholders acquire more shares either in the year 
before the offer or afterwards. SEC filing requirements for institutional 
investors could explain why old blockholders do not acquire additional 
shares during MBO contests. The SEC requires that institutional filers 
do not intend to change or influence control of the firm. These 
requirements are likely to decrease incentives to develop expertise in 
identifying low offers and/or to negotiate for a better offer. In addition, 
other regulations could rule out block acquisitions by institutional 
investors (see Roe, 1990). Finally, Table 4 shows that old blockholders 
are less likely to take observable actions during the MBO contest. Only 
13 out of 143 old block holders are active compared with 45 out of 90 
new blockholders.  
Table 5 reports the type of actions that new blockholders take. 
Table 5 also provides direct evidence in support of causality as well as 
insight into the methods blockholders use to influence both the buyout 
price and the buyout outcome. Table 5 includes the frequency of the 
different types of actions taken which are cross-tabulated with the 
types of blockholders in the sample. Table 5 shows that the investors I 
call ‘control specialists/arbitragers’ account for the majority of the 
actions taken by new post-offer blockholders. Bidding is the action 
most often taken by new post-offer blockholders (49% of the time) 
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and can reflect the blockholders’ attempt to take over the firm at a 
higher price than management offered. (Blockholders do, in fact, 
successfully take over the firm about 15 % of the time.) Bidding can 
also be used as a tactic to elicit a higher bid. Professional investors can 
signal to other bidders the price at which they will relinquish control of 
their shares. Other bidders will match the blockholder’s bid as long as 
the blockholder’s offer is credible. Control specialists, i.e., frequent 
acquirers, have a reputation for making value-increasing changes in 
the firm by shaking up existing management, by finding a new 
management team, or, as a last resort, by acquiring the firm and 
making the changes themselves (see Holderness and Sheehan, 1985).  
Anecdotal evidence illustrates this alternative view: In the case 
of the Fruehauf MBO attempt, Asher Edelman acquired a block, then 
made a higher bid for the firm after management allied with a group of 
investors led by Merrill Lynch made a buyout offer. The Wall Street 
Journal (August 8, 1986) reports: ‘Indeed, sources said that Edelman 
and his advisors were ‘shocked’ at the Merrill Lynch group’s failure to 
increase its offer. The Edelman Group had publicly indicated a 
willingness to bid $49.50, and one source said they had expected the 
Merrill Lynch Group to bid at least $50 a share, outbidding Edelman 
and guaranteeing the New York investor a large profit on his holdings. 
Instead, the Edelman group may now find itself owning all of 
Fruehauf.’ Subsequently, a higher bid was made. Edelman did not end 
up acquiring the firm.  
The second most frequent action (15% of the time) is opposition 
to the MBO offer via proxy fights, litigation, or publicly stating the new 
blockholders are against the offer. This action can increase the 
blockholder’s bargaining position with management (the blockholder 
can agree to stop his actions in exchange for a higher offer) or by 
delaying the completion of the MBO, it can give higher bidders time to 
emerge (see Jarrell, 1985).  
Third, blockholders can elicit a higher bid by devising a superior 
restructuring plan that warrants a higher premium (20% of the time). 
Blockholders can state that they are working on such a plan, that they 
are meeting with executives and gaining access to nonpublic company 
records, or that they are obtaining a temporary board seat.  
Actions taken to thwart the MBO offer or that reflect 
participation in the restructuring, can be used to elicit a higher offer 
from another party or as part of a takeover attempt by the control 
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specialist/arbitrager himself. For example, a blockholder that makes a 
bid for the firm also litigates management as part of his takeover 
strategy. However, there is no significant association between bidding 
and other actions taken by control specialists/arbitragers (for actions 
to thwart MBO attempt, chi-square = 0.027, p-value = 0.87, and for 
participation in restructuring, chi-square = 0.285, p-value = 0.59). 
This finding suggests that occasionally, the other actions are taken as 
part of a takeover attempt, and sometimes they are taken to elicit a 
higher offer from another party.  
I also investigate actions taken by new pre-offer blockholders. 
As Table 5 shows, investors who acquire a block before the MBO offer 
are active both before and after the offer. There is also no significant 
difference between the actions taken by investors who acquire a block 
before and those who acquire a block after the MBO offer. Bidding, 
waging a proxy fight, litigating to drop antitakeover defenses, meeting 
with executives, etc., are all actions that are likely to be perceived by 
management as a takeover threat and prompt an MBO offer. However, 
Table 5 shows that frequent acquirers account for more of the actions 
taken by new pre-offer blockholders, while equity-holding companies 
account for more of the actions taken by new post-offer blockholders. 
This finding suggests that different types of professional investors play 
different roles in; MBO contests; one type of investor, i.e., frequent 
acquirers, precipitates offers, while another, i.e., equity holding 
companies, contests them.  
 
3.3. Professional investors and pre-existing outside 
blockholders  
I define pre-existing blockholders as old 13D blockholders, new 
pre-offer blockholders, and institutional holders reported as of the 
month of the MBO offer. The control specialist’s power depends in part 
on the character of those pre-existing blockholders. If pre-existing 
blockholders are aligned with management, they are likely to vote 
against the new blockholder and neutralize his voting power. In 
contrast, if pre-existing blockholders are not aligned with 
management, they have an incentive to vote for the higher offer, and 
thus become the newcomer’s ally. However, if pre-existing 
blockholders are already involved in negotiating the offer, the new 
investor is less likely to gain from entering into negotiations; ongoing 
actions can already have achieved a higher premium. The incentive to 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 40, No. 2 (February 1996): pg. 267-294. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
15 
 
be an active control specialist thus depends on the behavior of pre-
existing blockholders.  
There is no significant correlation between a new post-offer 
block acquisition and the percentage of shares outstanding held by old 
13D outside blockholders (correlation coefficient = -0.10, p-value = 
0.30). A new post-offer block acquisition is positively correlated with 
the total percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions 
(correlation coefficient = 0.06, p-value = 0.56). These findings 
suggest that both institutional holders and old 13D blockholders do not 
substitute for new investors in negotiating during the contest. The 
correlations between old 13D and institutional holdings and a new pre-
offer block acquisition are similar. A new pre-offer block acquisition is 
not significantly correlated with the level of old 13D outside 
blockholdings (correlation coefficient = 0.01, p-value = 0.93), but is 
positively correlated with the level of preexisting institutional holdings 
(correlation coefficient = 0.26, p-value = 0.01).  
In contrast, a new post-offer block acquisition is negatively 
correlated with the percentage of shares outstanding held by new pre-
offer blockholders (correlation coefficient = -0.14, p-value = 0.08). 
This finding suggests that new pre- and post-offer blockholders 
substitute for each other in negotiating for a higher offer. Additional 
evidence presented in the following sections suggests that new pre-
offer blockholders generate ‘high’ initial offers, while new post-offer 
blockholders contest ‘low’ initial offers.  
 
3.4. A higher buyout offer versus ‘side payments’  
Professional investors can acquire a block in anticipation of 
receiving side payments from management and/or a higher buyout 
premium from either management or a third party. The best-known 
side payment is ‘greenmail’, in which management buys back such 
blocks at a premium above the current market price. Another practice 
is for management to offer blockholders participation in post-buyout 
equity.  
Professional investors receive side payments infrequently. New 
post-offer blockholders who are control specialists/arbitragers 
participate in post-buyout equity in only three firms (however, these 
cases are best characterized as ‘takeovers’ rather than ‘deals’ worked 
out with management), and never accept some other type of side 
payment (see Table 5). The findings for new pre-offer blockholders 
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who are control specialists/arbitragers are similar. These investors 
participate in post-buyout equity in only one firm, and accept some 
other type of side payment only three times (see Table 5).  
Table 6 reports the Spearman rank correlations between a 
higher offer (from either management or an outside bidder other than 
a blockholder) after the initial MBO offer and new block acquisitions 
made before the higher offer. New blockholders that are corporations 
are differentiated from control specialists/arbitragers, since the latter 
are more important to the hypothesis concerning the role of 
professional investors in the contest.4 I make distinctions between 
active and passive blockholders; I also distinguish between when these 
actions are taken. Actions before the offer are likely to lead to higher 
initial offers, while actions after the offer are likely to lead to higher 
subsequent offers. Table 6 includes other contest events that are likely 
to have an effect on the probability of a higher offer. I include both 
events that occur in the year prior to the MBO offer and events that 
occur after the MBO offer but before the higher offer. I also examine 
the relation between pre-existing ownership structure and the 
likelihood of a higher offer. Variables that measure pre-existing 
ownership structure include inside holdings, institutional holdings, the 
level of old 13D blockholdings, and dummy variables for different 
types of new pre-offer blockholders.  
Table 6 shows that, as predicted, a higher offer is significantly, 
positively correlated with both the post-offer acquisition of a block by a 
control specialist/arbitrager (either active or passive) after the MBO 
offer, but before the higher offer, and with a pre-offer acquisition of a 
block by a control specialist/arbitrager who takes actions after the 
offer. Size is also positively correlated with a higher offer. It is likely 
that larger buyouts are subject to more bidding.  
Table 6 also reports the results of a multivariate logit 
regression. It shows that statistically the effects of a new post-offer 
acquisition by an active control specialist/arbitrager are only weakly 
significant after controlling for other variables. However, 
multicollinearity between a new post-offer acquisition by an active 
control specialist/arbitrager and other variables is likely to decrease 
the chance that all are found significant in a regression. A new post-
offer acquisition of a block by an active control specialist/arbitrager is 
both positively correlated with a new post-offer acquisition by a 
passive control specialist/arbitrager (correlation coefficient = 0.14, p-
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value = 0.15) and a new pre-offer acquisition by a control 
specialist/arbitrager who takes actions after the offer (correlation 
coefficient = 0.17, p-value = 0.07).  
An alternative dependent variable is the percentage change in 
the premium offered. However, buyout offers sometimes consist of a 
mix of both cash and newly issued securities. So a percentage change 
in the offer cannot be easily calculated. For a subsample of firms with 
all cash offers (n = 59), I calculate a percentage change in the 
premium offered. For firms with a new post-offer block acquisition by 
an active control specialist/arbitrager the average change in the 
premium for cash offers is 13.91 % (median = 21.54%, n = 5) but 
only 2.14% (median = 0%, n = 54) for firms with no new post-offer 
block acquisition by an active control specialist/arbitrager. This 
difference is statistically significant at the 7% level, using a Wilcoxon 
sign rank t-test. In contrast, for firms with a new pre-offer block 
acquisition by an active control specialist/arbitrager the change in the 
premium for cash offers (mean = 9.18%, median = 0%, n = 9) is not 
statistically different from firms with no new pre-offer block acquisition 
by an active control specialist/arbitrager (mean = 2.05%, median = 
0%, n = 50). However, it is likely that a new pre-offer block 
acquisition by an active control specialist/arbitrager ensures that offers 
are fair to begin with.  
 
3.5. Block acquisitions and the buyout outcome  
Takeover specialists can increase returns to shareholders, either 
by taking over the firm themselves or by facilitating a takeover by a 
higher third party bidder (see Holderness and Sheehan, 1986; Jensen 
and Ruback, 1983). Thus, professional investors can influence who 
acquires the firm as well as the price paid for the firm. 
Table 7 shows that the success of an outside party takeover is 
positively correlated with a new post-offer block acquisition by an 
active control specialist/arbitrager. All of these takeovers occur at a 
higher price than that offered by management. Thus, this finding 
supports the hypothesis that professional investors are more likely to 
acquire a block when the management bid is ‘low’. In contrast, there is 
no significant correlation between the success of an outside party 
takeover and a new pre-offer block acquisition by a control 
specialist/arbitrager who takes actions either before or after the offer. 
However, it is unlikely that managers make an MBO offer without 
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receiving the prior cooperation of large blockholders. An outside party 
takeover is also significantly correlated with a new post-offer block 
acquisition by a corporation. These companies are likely to acquire a 
‘toe-hold’ to increase the probability of a successful bid (see Walking, 
1985; Edminster and Walking, 1985). Finally, an outside party 
takeover is significantly and negatively correlated with the level of 
inside holdings and old 13D outside holdings. This finding is consistent 
with Stulz's (1988) prediction that large inside holdings give managers 
the power to resist an outside takeover. This finding also suggests that 
old 13D blockholders are aligned with management during the buyout 
contest.  
Table 7 reports the results of a multivariate logit regression. A 
block acquisition made after the offer by an active control 
specialist/arbitrager continues to significantly increase the likelihood of 
an outside party takeover. Four out of 24 or 20% of these takeovers 
are completed by control specialists/arbitragers, and the remaining 
80% are completed by corporations. Overall, the evidence indicates 
that control specialists both ‘facilit(ate) transfers of control’ to a third-
party at a higher price and ‘take control’ of the firm for themselves 
(see Jensen and Ruback, 1983). These findings are consistent with 
those of other researchers. Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) find that 
there are acquisitions by frequent purchasers who rarely take over the 
firm; Holderness and Sheehan (1985) find that after a block 
acquisition by a ‘raider’ three firms are reorganized by the raiders 
themselves, whereas ten firms are reorganized by third parties.  
 
5. Summary and conclusion  
I document changes in outside blockholdings around MBO 
attempts. Outside ownership concentration increases around the time 
of an MBO offer. Much of the increase takes the form of newly 
accumulated blocks held temporarily by professional investors who 
play an active role in the buyout contest. Their participation increases 
the likelihood that the MBO fails, and the firm is taken over by either 
the professional investor or a higher third-party bidder. The overall 
weight of the evidence supports the hypothesis that block acquisitions 
by professional investors increase buyout premiums earned by 
shareholders.  
While the findings of this study are specific to the role of 
ownership structure in MBO contests, they also have general 
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implications for that role in the firm. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) explain 
cross-sectional variation in ownership structure by looking at different 
characteristics of firms at the same point in ‘calendar time’. Rather 
than observing cross-sectional variation in the levels of outside 
ownership, my research investigates changes in outside ownership 
concentration conditional on a particular event, the announcement of 
an MBO offer. This is an example of the general proposition that 
incentives to concentrate outside ownership are likely to vary over 
time, as the value of corporate control changes. Other examples are 
provided by Dodd and Warner (1983), who find that the value of the 
vote attached to shares increases around proxy contests, and Gilson 
(1990), who finds outside block ownership increases in firms 
undergoing bankruptcy. Other major corporate events are potential 
areas for future research.  
Finally, this research adds to the recent empirical literature on 
the various roles of blockholders in monitoring management (see 
Holderness and Sheehan 1985; Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; 
Barclay and Holderness, 1989). Different types of blockholders are 
likely to have different comparative advantages in monitoring various 
types of managerial activities. In an MBO contest, managers have an 
inherent conflict of interest with shareholders since they have no 
incentive to offer their best price for the firm. The evidence presented 
in this study indicates that pre-existing blockholders do not actively 
negotiate during the MBO contest. Instead, new blockholders who are 
control specialists provide these negotiating benefits to shareholders.  
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Notes  
 1 I am grateful for Steven Kaplan's generosity in supplying his 
sample. This sample consists of both successful and unsuccessful 
management buyouts. The successful buyouts include all buyouts 
of at least $100 million that are announced or completed between 
1984 and 1987. He also includes an incomplete sample of buyouts 
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that are worth less than $100 million. The failed buyouts include all 
failed buyouts announced between 1984 and 1985 of at least $50 
million.  
 2 The blockholders in the sample whom I classify as frequent 
acquirers are: Victor Posner, Asher Edelman, the Bass brothers, 
Paul Bilzerian, Ivan Boesky, Carl Icahn, Irwin Jacobs, Samuel 
Belzberg, the Dart Group, Ronald Perelman, and David Murdoch. 
Examples of some of the blockholders in my sample that I classify 
as equity-holding companies are: Jamie Securities Co., Gabelli 
Group, and Mutual Shares Corp.  
 3 Following Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), I classify the 
following investors as institutional investors: insurance companies, 
banks, nonbank trusts, pension fund trusts, mutual funds, 
endowments, private pension funds, brokerage houses, investment 
counsel firms, and miscellaneous financial service firms.  
 4 There are two active new post-offer blockholders (an investment 
counsel firm and a miscellaneous financial service firm) included as 
control specialists/arbitragers in the tests reported in Tables 6 and 
7.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 1. Frequency of outcomes of management buyout attempts for a sample of 111 
firms in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout attempt is defined as any 
announcement in which management, either alone or with a group of equity investors, 
makes an offer to buy the firm. Management-initiated buyouts are buyouts in which 
management made the first offer to buy the firm. Outside-party initiated buyouts are 
buyouts in which an outside party made the first offer to buy the firm. Failed buyouts 
are firms that continue to have publicly traded stock two years after the initial buyout 
offer. Number of firms in each category is reported (percentage of total sample in 
parentheses) 
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Table 2. Chronology of events during management buyout attempts for a sample of 
111 firms in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout attempt is defined as 
any announcement in which management, either alone or with a group of equity 
investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. The cumulative number of firms with 
occurrence of event by month-end is reported. 
 
 
n.a. = not applicable.  
aCumulative abnormal returns are the summation of abnormal returns on day -1, 0, 
+1. Day 0 is the day the event was announced in the Wall Street Journal or came over 
the Dow Jones News Wire. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between 
realized returns and market-model expected returns. The CRSP (NASDAQ) value-
weighted index is used as the market index for CRSP (NASDAQ) firms. The market 
model is estimated using 200 daily returns 120 days prior to the initial buyout 
announcement.  
bZ-statistics calculated according to the standardized prediction errors method given in 
the Appendix of Dodd and Warner (1983).  
cThe time period is 12 months before the MBO offer to the month of the MBO offer.  
dCompetitive bid is defined as any bid from an outside party (other than a blockholder) 
after the initial offer.  
eManagerial resistance is defined as taking anyone of the following actions: (1) 
adopting an antitakeover amendment; (2) litigating an outside bidder; (3) increasing 
management’s effective stake by buying back shares, debt for equity swap, 
repurchase of convertible preferred or convertible debt for cash, private placement of 
equity, or repurchase of shares from an investor.  
fReport of a SEC 13D filing of a block acquisition of 5% or more in either the Wall 
Street Journal or the Dow Jones News Wire.  
gBlockholder actions are defined as reports in the financial press of blockholder 
statements or actions other than changes in shareholdings, alone.  
hSignificant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3. Increases in blockholdings around management buyout attempts for a sample 
of 111 firms in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout attempt is defined as 
any announcement in which management, either alone or with a group of equity 
investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. 
 
n.a. = not applicable.  
aNew post-offer blockholders are those whose initial 13D filing is announced between 
30 days and up to 24 months after the management buyout offer.  
bNew pre-offer blockholders are those whose initial 13D filing is announced between 
12 months prior to the management buyout offer and up to 30 days after the 
management buyout offer.  
cOld blockholders are those who own shares 12 months prior to the management 
buyout offer.  
dThe number of days used is for the first block acquisition after the MBO 
announcement, and for the first block acquisition before the MBO announcement when 
there are multiple acquisitions. 
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Table 4. Number of different types of blockholders for a sample of 111 firms with a 
management buyout attempt in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout 
attempt is defined as any announcement in which management, either alone or with a 
group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. 
 
aSee notes Table 3.  
bExamples of some of the blockholders in my sample that I classify as equity-holding 
companies are: Jamie Securities Co., Gabelli Group, and Mutual Shares Corp.  
cThe blockholders in the sample whom I classify as frequent acquirers are: Victor 
Posner, Asher Edelman, the Bass brothers, Paul Bilzerian, Ivan Boesky, Carl Icahn, 
Irwin Jacobs, Samuel Belzberg, the Dart Group, Ronald Perelman, and David Murdock. 
dA miscellaneous corporation is company that does not provide financial services of 
any kind. An example of some of the firms in my sample that I classify as 
miscellaneous corporations are Macmillan, Inc., Pillsbury, and Fisher Foods, Inc.  
eA miscellaneous individual is an individual other than a frequent acquirer. Examples of 
individuals that I classify as miscellaneous in my sample are Beth A. Vanderberg, Mrs. 
Daryl D. Jones, and Steven J. Kumble.  
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fBlockholders are classified as brokerage houses if that is the characterization in the 
proxy statement or the financial press. The one brokerage house in my sample is 
Spear, Leeds, & Kellog.  
gBlockholders are classified as investment counsel firms if that is the characterization 
in the proxy statement or the financial press. Examples of investment counsel firms in 
my sample are First Pacific Advisors, Inc., Templeton Investment Counsel, Inc., and 
William D. Witt, Inc.  
hMiscellaneous financial services firms are firms that provide several financial services, 
including investment banking services. Examples of miscellaneous financial service 
firms in my sample are Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, T. Rowe Price Associates, 
PaineWebber Inc.  
iActive blockholders are those who are reported as taking some type of action other 
than the acquisition of shares during the 12 months prior to the MBO offer or 
afterwards.  
jChi-square tests are used to test various associations; the association between new 
blockholder types and whether the block is acquired pre-offer or post-offer is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels; the association between new blockholder 
types and old blockholder types is statistically significant at the 1% level; the 
association between whether the new block is acquired pre-offer or post-offer and the 
blockholder's active participation in the contest is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels; and the association between whether the blockholder is new or 
old, and the blockholder's active participation in the contest is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. 
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Table 5. Number of different types of actions taken by different typesa of blockholders 
around a management buyout attempt for a sample of 111 firms in the period 1984 to 
1987.b A management buyout attempt is defined as any announcement in which 
management, either alone or with a group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy 
the firm (percentage of total actions shown in parentheses). 
 
n.a. = not applicable.  
aFor definitions of different types, see notes to Tables 3 and 4.  
bThe time period is 12 months before the MBO offer until the buyout is completed, or 
24 months after the MBO offer in the case of failed buyouts. 
cChi-square tests are used to test various associations: The association between 
blockholder type and action type is statistically significant at the 10% level for post-
block acquisitions only; the association between types of blockholders taking actions 
and whether the block is a acquired before or after the MBO offer is statistically 
significant at the 1% level; the association between types of actions and whether the 
block is a acquired before or after the MBO offer is not statistically significant; and the 
association between types of actions taken by new pre-offer blockholders and whether 
the action is taken before or after the MBO offer is not statistically significant. 
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Table 6. The relation between a higher offer from either management or an outside 
third-party other than a blockholder after an initial management buyout offer and 
ownership structure and contest events for a sample of 111 firms in the period 1984 
to 1987. A management buyout offer is defined as any announcement in which 
management, either alone or with a group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy 
the firm (p-value for significance of coefficient in parentheses). 
 
aAll firm characteristics measured during the period 12 months prior to the MBO offer 
to the higher offer. For firms with no higher offer measured to the buyout completion, 
or 24 months after the MBO offer in the case of failed buyouts.  
bSee notes to Table 2.  
cTotal equity value is the number of shares outstanding times price per share one 
month prior to the initial buyout offer.  
dInside holdings are measured 12 months prior to the MBO offer.  
eInstitutional holdings are total monthly institutional holdings measured in the month 
of the MBO offer.  
fOld 13D outside holdings are total 13D holdings measured 12 months prior to the 
MBO offer.  
gFor definitions of blockholder types see notes to Tables 3 and 4. 
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Table 7. The relation between the successful takeover of the firm by an outside party 
and ownership structure and contest events for a sample of 111 firms in the period 
1984 to 1987. A management buyout offer is defined as any announcement in which 
management, either alone or with a group of equity investors, makes an offer to buy 
the firm (p-value for significance of coefficient in parentheses). 
 
aFor definitions of independent variables, see notes to Table 6. 
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Figure 1 
 
Average level of monthly outside blockholdings around management buyout attempts 
for a sample of 111 firms in the period 1984 to 1987. A management buyout attempt 
is defined as any announcement in which management, either alone or with a group of 
equity investors, makes an offer to buy the firm. Total institutional holdings for each 
firm is the total percentage of shares outstanding held by all institutional investors 
(both 13F and 13G filers). Total 13D holdings for each firm is the sum of each 13D 
blockholder's highest holdings within that month. Total outside holdings is the sum of 
total institutional and total 13D holdings. 
